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Abstract—Risk assessment is an inevitable step in implemen-
tation of a cyber-defense strategy. An important part of this
assessment is to reason about the impact of possible attacks. In
this paper, we propose a framework for estimating the impact of
cyber-attacks in stochastic linear control systems. The framework
can be used to estimate the impact of denial of service, rerouting,
sign alternation, replay, false data injection, and bias injection
attacks. For the stealthiness constraint, we adopt the Kullback-
Leibler divergence between residual sequences during the attack.
Two impact metrics are considered: (1) The probability that some
of the critical states leave a safety region; and (2) The expected
value of the infinity norm of the critical states. For the first metric,
we prove that the impact estimation problem can be reduced to
a set of convex optimization problems. Thus, the exact solution
can be found efficiently. For the second metric, we derive an
efficient to calculate lower bound. Finally, we demonstrate how
the framework can be used for risk assessment on an example.
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial control systems (ICS) operate physical processes
of great societal significance. Examples include electricity
production, water purification, transportation, and oil and gas
distribution. For this reason, ensuring security of ICS is
very important. Unfortunately, it is known that many security
vulnerabilities can be found within these systems [1], [2].
These vulnerabilities can be exploited by malicious attackers to
harm ICS, as demonstrated through several incidents that have
happened so far [3]–[5]. Therefore, effective cyber-defense
strategies have to be developed.
However, protecting ICS is more complicated and costly
than protecting regular IT systems [6]. Thus, the recommen-
dation is to conduct a risk assessment prior to implementing
a defense strategy [1], [2]. The goal of this assessment is to
prioritize among vulnerabilities, which is done based on the
likelihood that vulnerabilities are exploited, and the impact
that can happen if exploitation occurs [7]. The resources can
then be focused in preventing the most critical vulnerabilities.
Motivated by the risk assessment application, we study the
impact estimation problem. This problem reduces to a con-
strained maximization problem, where the objective function
is an impact metric. The constraints of the problem vary, but
in most of the cases they include stealthiness constraint. In
other words, we want to check if the attacker can conduct
large damage and remain stealthy at the same time.
So far, significant effort has been dedicated towards estimat-
ing impact of attacks that remain undetected by the chi-square
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anomaly detector [8]–[13]. In these studies, the reachable
sets were predominantly used to characterize the impact, and
algorithms for calculating upper and lower bounds of these
sets were proposed in several works [8]–[10]. Other types of
detectors have also been considered [14]–[19]. For example,
Ca´rdenas et al. considered a cumulative sum (CUSUM) detec-
tor, and investigated the impact of several attack strategies that
remain undetected by this detector [14]. In [15], the impact of
zero alarm attacks was used to compare chi-square, windowed
chi-square, and CUSUM detectors.
Two directions in which the aforementioned studies can
be extended are outlined next. Firstly, these works usually
assume resourceful attackers, with the full model knowledge
and the ability to inject arbitrary signals to the sensors and
actuators it controls. However, less complex attacks, which are
also more likely to happen, are important to consider for risk
assessment. For instance, we may encounter the case where a
certain vulnerability allows the attacker to deny the operator
access to a signal, but not to set the signal to an arbitrary value.
Moreover, comparing vulnerabilities based on a single attack
model may lead to a biased judgment. Secondly, these works
focus their analysis on particular types of anomaly detectors.
Thus, the impact analysis is carried out for every detector
separately. In summary, a more general framework for risk
assessment is desirable.
The main obstacle towards such a framework is the nature
of the worst-case impact estimation problem, which generally
is not possible to formulate as a convex optimization problem.
Exceptions do exist, however. For example, in [19], the authors
introduced the infinity norm of critical states to quantify the
impact under the CUSUM detector. They showed that the
exact value of impact can be obtained by solving a set of
convex problems. This useful property of the infinity norm was
also recognized in [20], [21], where the impact was obtained
by solving a set of linear programs. However, these works
neglect the influence of noise. Thus, to extend the analysis
to more general stochastic systems, a suitable replacement for
the infinity norm with similar convenient properties is needed.
The contributions of our work are as follows. Firstly, we
propose a unified framework for quantifying the impact of
cyber-attack strategies for stochastic control systems. The
framework covers both advanced injection strategies such as
false data injection (FDI) [8], [19] and bias injection [17],
[22], but also simpler strategies such as denial of service
(DoS) [6], [23], replay [24], rerouting [25], [26], and sign al-
ternation attacks [12]. Additionally, Kullback-Leibler (KL) di-
vergence [27] is used to define a stealthiness constraint, which
makes the framework independent of the choice of anomaly
detector. Stealthiness constraints based on KL–divergence have
been used in several works so far [28]–[31].
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2The second and third contributions concern solving the im-
pact estimation problem. Particularly, we propose two metrics
as a substitute for the infinity norm in stochastic systems:
The probability that some of the critical states leave a safety
region (I1) and the expected value of the infinity norm of
the critical states (I2). As the second contribution, we show
that I1 has the same desirable properties as infinity norm.
That is, we prove that the exact value of the impact for this
metric can be obtained by solving a set of convex problems
(Theorem 1). Unfortunately, I2 does not have the closed form
expression in general, and is not trivial to evaluate. However,
we show how to obtain an efficient to calculate lower bound
for I2 (Theorem 2), which is our third contribution. Finally,
the applicability of our framework for risk assessment is
demonstrated on a numerical example.
We remark that the preliminary version of this paper ap-
peared in [32]. This work differs from [32] in the following
aspects: (1) A stochastic model is considered; (2) This work
is not constrained to certain classes of anomaly detectors; (3)
Different impact metrics are used; (4) Due to the differences
in (1)–(3), a different theoretical analysis is required to derive
the main results; (5) The numerical example is extended.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we in-
troduce the model setup. In Section III, we formulate the
impact estimation problem. In Section IV, we present the main
technical results of the paper. In Section V, we introduce attack
strategies compatible with our framework. In Section VI, we
illustrate the applicability of our framework on a numerical
example. In Section VII, we conclude.
Notation. We denote by: 0m×n the zero-matrix with m
rows and n columns; In the identity matrix with n rows and
columns; T (i, :) the i-th row of matrix T ; T (i, j) the element
of matrix T positioned in the i-th row and j-th column;
f (i) the i-th element of vector f ; N (µ,Σ) the Gaussian
distribution with the mean µ and the covariance Σ. For a signal
x : Z≥0 → Rn, x0:N is given by x0:N = [x(0)T . . . x(N)T ]T .
II. MODEL SETUP
The system consists of a physical plant, estimator, con-
troller, and anomaly detector. The plant is modeled as
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu˜(k) + v(k)
y(k) = Cx(k) + w(k)
(1)
where x(k) ∈ Rnx is the plant state, y(k) ∈ Rny is the
vector of measurements, u˜(k) ∈ Rnu is the control signal
applied to the plant, and v(k) ∈ Rnx and w(k) ∈ Rny are
process and measurement noises, respectively. These processes
are independent Gaussian white processes with zero mean and
covariance matrices Σv and Σw. The initial state x(−∞) is
zero mean Gaussian with covariance Σ−∞ and independent of
v and w. We assume Σv , Σw, Σ−∞ are positive definite, the
pair (C,A) is observable, and the pair (B,A) is controllable.
To estimate the state x, the Kalman filter is used. We assume
that the filter has converged to the steady state regime before
the attack starts, so the state estimate is given by
xˆ(k + 1) = (A−KC)xˆ(k) +Bu(k) +Ky˜(k) (2)
where xˆ(k) ∈ Rnx represents the one step ahead prediction
of x(k), u(k) ∈ Rnu is the control signal calculated by
the controller, and y˜(k) ∈ Rny is the measurement signal
received by the estimator. The steady state Kalman gain is
given by K = AΣeCT (CΣeCT+Σw)−1 where Σe is the error
covariance matrix obtained by solving the Riccati equation
Σe = AΣeA
T +Σv−AΣeCT (CΣeCT +Σw)−1CΣeAT . This
gain exists under the assumptions on the noise processes, and
it is also known that A−KC is asymptotically stable [33].
The controller is of the form
u(k) = −Lxˆxˆ(k) + Lyryr(k) (3)
where yr(k) ∈ Rnyr is a bounded reference signal that satisfies
||Qyryr(k)||∞ ≤ 1 (4)
and Qyr ∈ Rnyr×nyr is a full rank scaling matrix. The direct
term Ly˜ y˜(k) can also be added to u(k), but we omit it for
the sake of brevity. We assume that stability and satisfactory
performances are obtained in absence of attacks. Additionally,
given that the reference is usually a constant signal that is not
updated often, we adopt the following standing assumption.
Assumption 1: The reference signal is a constant signal
yr(k) = yr that does not change during the attack. The system
has reached stationary regime before the attack starts. 
In absence of attacks, y˜(k) = y(k) and u˜(k) = u(k).
However, because of an attack or a fault in the system, these
values may differ. To detect these anomalies, an anomaly
detector is used. The first step of detection procedure is to
calculate the residual signal
r˜(k) = Σ−1/2r
(
y˜(k)− Cxˆ(k)) (5)
where Σr = CΣeCT + Σw. Note that Cxˆ(k) is the estimate
of the measurement vector based on the previous measure-
ments and the system model. Thus r˜(k) represents the scaled
difference between y˜(k) and its modeled (expected) behavior.
In the absence of anomalies, the residual sequence is a white
Gaussian process with zero mean value and identity covariance
matrix. Throughout the paper, we denote by r the non-attacked
residual signal to distinguish it from the attacked one.
The second step of the detection procedure is to process
the residual signal r˜ to obtain a security metric S. When
this metric exceeds a certain predefined threshold, an alarm is
raised. How S is determined depends on the detector. Some ex-
amples of the detectors include chi-square [34], CUSUM [35],
and multivariate exponential weighted moving average [36]
detectors. However, in this work, we are not focused on any
particular anomaly detector, so we do not need to define S.
We now introduce the model of attacker. For simplicity, we
assume that the attack starts at k = 0. The measurements y˜(k)
and the control signals u˜(k) are modeled by
y˜(k) = Λyy(k) + Γyay(k) + Γyas(k)
u˜(k) = Λuu(k) + Γuau(k)
(6)
where au(k) ∈ Rnau is the deterministic part of the attack
against the actuators, ay(k) ∈ Rnay is the deterministic part of
the attack against the sensors, and as(k) ∈ Rnay is a stochastic
signal the attacker injects. The matrices Γy , Γu, Λy , and Λu
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depend on the attack strategy and the attacker’s resources. We
explain how these matrices are formed in Section V.
By combining equations (1)–(3), (5), (6), the dynamics of
the system under attack can be expressed as
xe(k + 1) = A˜xe(k) + B˜f(k) + E˜yr + G˜a(k) + J˜as(k)
r˜(k) = C˜xe(k) + D˜f(k) + F˜ yr + H˜a(k) + K˜as(k)
(7)
where xe(k) = [x(k)T xˆ(k)T ]T , f(k) = [v(k)T w(k)T ]T , and
a(k) = [au(k)
T ay(k)
T ]T are the extended state, noise, and
attack vectors, respectively. We denote the dimension of a(k)
by na, and of f(k) by nf . The extended system matrices are
A˜ =
[
A −BΛuLxˆ
KΛyC A−KC −BLxˆ
]
B˜ =
[
Inx 0nx×ny
0nx×nx KΛy
]
C˜ = Σ−1/2r
[
ΛyC −C
]
D˜ = [0ny×nx Σ
−1/2
r Λy]
E˜ =
[
BΛuLyr
BLyr
]
F˜ = 0ny×nyr
G˜ =
[
BΓu 0nx×nay
0nx×nau KΓy
]
H˜ = [0ny×nauΣ
−1/2
r Γy]
J˜ =
[
0nx×nay
KΓy
]
K˜ = Σ−1/2r Γy.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formulate the problem of estimating
the attack impact. Prior to that, we introduce the decision
variables, the impact metrics, and some of the constraints.
A. Decision Variables
We are interested in estimating the impact of an attack on
the subset of states x during N time steps. Additionally, we
want to check if the attack remains stealthy during this time
interval. From (7), x is influenced by noise f , reference yr, and
attack signals a and as. As shown later, the impact metric and
the constraints are not dependent on a particular realization of
sequences f and as. However, they do depend on yr and a0:N .
Since we perform off-line analysis of the attack impact, we
do not know the exact value of the reference at the beginning
of the attack. Thus, we identify the worst possible value of yr
when estimating the impact. We also assume that the attacker
selects the worst possible sequence a0:N to maximize the
damage. Thus, we define the decision variables of the problem
to be yr and a0:N , and denote them by d =
[
a0:N
yr
]
.
B. Impact Metrics
The impact metrics we define are based on the concept of
critical states. These states are defined as z(k) = Qzx(k),
where Qz ∈ Rnz×nx is a full row rank scaling matrix, and
nz ≤ nx is the number of the critical states. The critical
states may model the flow of energy through the power line
that should be maintained within predefined bounds, or a
temperature that should not exceed some safety limit. If any
of the critical states is larger than 1, that indicates a dangerous
state of the system.
Example 1: Let x = [x(1) x(2)]T . Let x(2) be the critical
state that should be kept within the interval [−x¯(2), x¯(2)],
x¯(2) ≥ 0. The matrix Qz is then defined by Qz = [0 1/x¯(2)].
Therefore, if |x(2)(k)| ≥ x¯(2), then |z(k)| ≥ 1. 
In the previous work on deterministic systems [19], the
impact metric was defined as
I(d) = ||z1:N ||∞. (8)
Values of I larger than 1 imply that the attacker can drive some
of the critical states outside the safety region. However, in this
paper, the state is influenced by the noise in addition to attacks.
Therefore, even in the absence of attacks, some of the critical
states can become larger than 1 with non-zero probability. To
make the impact metric more suitable for stochastic systems,
we define a new metric
I1(d) = maxi∈{1,...,nzN} P(|z(i)1:N | ≥ 1). (9)
If I1 is close to 1, then we know there is a high probability
that some of the critical states leave the safety region. If I1 is
close to 0, the critical states stay within the safety region with
high probability, and the attack is harmless. Another possible
impact metric is
I2(d) = E{||z1:N ||∞}. (10)
Unfortunately, the expected value of the ∞-norm does not
have a closed form expression, and is hard to evaluate in
general. Thus, we are primarily focused on the metric I1.
C. Stealthiness Constraint and Constraints on Attack Signals
We first discuss the stealthiness constraint. To define this
constraint, we use KL–divergence. The KL–divergence gives
the distance between probability density functions p and q over
a sample space X , and is defined by
D(p||q) =
∫
X
log
(
p(x)
q(x)
)
p(x)dx.
It is known that D(p||q) ≥ 0 with equality if and only if p
equals q almost everywhere. The KL–divergence stealthiness
constraint can take different forms [28]–[31]. Since we observe
the attack over the time interval [0, N ], we adopt the constraint
1
N + 1
D(r˜0:N ||r0:N ) ≤ . (11)
The idea is that if the KL–divergence between the probability
density functions of attacked r˜0:N and non-attacked r0:N
residual sequences remains small, then these density functions
are similar, and the attack stays stealthy.
The advantages of using KL–divergence as a stealthiness
constraint include the following. Firstly, as shown later, this
constraint is a convex symmetric constraint for the class of
attacks that we observe. Secondly, the impact analysis is
made independent of the choice of anomaly detector. Thirdly,
generating attacks that satisfy (11) can be a reasonable choice
by the attacker that does not know which anomaly detector is
deployed. Finally, it was shown that for certain types of attacks
and anomaly detectors, other types of stealthiness constraints
can be replaced by a KL–divergence based constraint [8].
The second set of the constraints we discuss come from a
particular attack strategy. In general, we do not know which
4attack strategy the attacker will use. Thus, to reason about
the attack and estimate its impact, a number of strategies
has been modeled throughout the literature. In this paper, we
consider DoS, rerouting, sign alternation, replay, FDI, and bias
injection attacks. Each of these strategies introduces additional
constraints on a and as. However, we show in Section V that
all of the strategies can be captured by (6), and the constraints
Faa0:N = 0 (12)
as0:N = Tsxxe(Ns) + Tsryr + TsffNs:−1 (13)
where Ns < 0, Fa ∈ RnFa×(N+1)na , and Tsx, Tsr, and Tsf
are the matrices of appropriate dimensions.
D. Problem Formulation
Based on the previous discussion, we introduce the problem
of estimating attack impact. We first consider the metric I1.
Problem 1: Estimating impact using I1
maximize
d
I1(d)
subject to xe(k) and r˜(k) satisfy (7) (C1)
as0:N satisfies (13) (C2)
||Qd||∞ ≤ 1 (C3)
1
N + 1
D(r˜0:N ||r0:N ) ≤  (C4)
Fd = 0 (C5)
In this problem, we check if the attack can have large impact
on the system by maximizing I1. The constraint: (C1) ensures
that physical equations of the system are satisfied; (C2) im-
poses the assumption on the form of as0:N ; (C3) comes from
the reference constraint (4), where Q = [0nyr×(N+1)na Qyr ];
(C4) is the stealthiness constraint; (C5) comes from (12),
where F = [Fa 0nFa×nyr ]. For brevity of notation, we denote
the constraints (C1)–(C5) with C. We also introduce the impact
estimation problem based on I2.
Problem 2: Estimating impact using I2
maximized∈C I2(d)
The following remarks are in place.
Remark 1: N and  should be seen as tuning parameters.
Naturally, we first want to discover attacks that result in high
impact in short amount of time, without changing the residual
distribution considerably. Thus, choosing small values of N
and  is a good starting point for the analysis. If the budget is
large enough to prevent these attacks, we can start increasing
the parameters to discover less dangerous attacks. 
Remark 2: One can also consider maximizing impact in Nz
steps and imposing stealthiness in Nr 6= Nz steps. The case
Nz < Nr captures attacks that maximize damage in Nz steps,
and prevent the defender noticing this in additional Nr −Nz
steps. The case Nz > Nr models ambush attacks [37], where
the attacker stealthily prepares Nr steps, and then launches a
not necessarily stealthy attack in the remaining time. Although
we focus on the case Nr = Nz = N , the analysis that follows
can be extended to cover the aforementioned cases as well. 
Remark 3: Problems 1 and 2 can be infeasible due to (C4).
If that is the case, we define the impact to be 0. 
Problems 1 and 2 are constrained maximization problems.
Unfortunately, efficient algorithms for solving these type of
problems are unknown in general. Nevertheless, in the next
section, we propose an efficient way to obtain the optimal
value of Problem 1, and a lower bound for Problem 2.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we prove that the optimal value of Problem 1
can be obtained by solving a set of convex optimization
problems (Theorem 1). Furthermore, we show that in the
process of solving Problem 1, we also obtain a lower bound of
Problem 2 (Theorem 2). Prior to proving Theorems 1 and 2,
we introduce some technical results.
A. Preliminaries
We begin by introducing the two lemmas. The first lemma
determines distribution of the state xe prior to attacks. The
second one states that for the class of the attacks we observe,
the mean values of z1:N and r˜0:N are linear in d and have
fixed covariance matrices. The proofs of all the lemmas from
this section are presented in Appendix.
Lemma 1: Assume that attacks are not present and that
the system has reached the stationary regime. Then xe is
distributed according to N (T0yr,Σ0).
Lemma 2: In the presence of attacks, z1:N ∼ N (TZd,ΣZ)
and r˜0:N ∼ N (TRd,ΣR), where TZ , TR, ΣZ , ΣR are not
dependent on d, and ΣZ is positive definite.
While it can be proven that ΣZ is positive definite, the same
claim does not hold for ΣR. In what follows, we assume that
ΣR is positive definite. We later argue that the cases where
ΣR is positive semidefinite are not of practical significance.
Assumption 2: ΣR is a positive definite matrix.
Once Assumption 2 holds, the constraint (11) is well defined
and represents a convex and symmetric constraint in d.
Lemma 3: The constraint (11) reduces to the constraint
dTTTRTRd ≤ ′
where ′ = (N + 1)(2+ ny)− tr(ΣR) + ln det(ΣR).
Note that if some of the eigenvalues of ΣR approach 0,
then ′ approaches −∞. The constraint (11) then becomes
impossible to satisfy, which justifies excluding the cases where
ΣR is semidefinite from the analysis.
We now introduce the problem that turns out to be crucial
for solving Problem 1 and lower bounding Problem 2:
maximized∈C µi(d) = E{z(i)1:N} (14)
where i ∈ {1, . . . , nzN}. Note that except for the objective
that is different, the constraints and the decision variables are
the same as those for Problems 1 and 2. This problem is
reducible to a convex optimization problem, which implies that
it can be solved efficiently, using well established algorithms.
Proposition 1: The problem given by (14) is reducible to a
convex optimization problem with symmetric constraints.
Proof. From Lemma 2, E{z(i)1:N} = TZ(i, :)d. Thus, the objec-
tive function is linear in d, so it is simultaneously concave and
convex. The constraints (C1) and (C2) enforce distributions
of z1:N and r˜0:N given in Lemma 2. The constraint (C3)
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is symmetric and convex in d due to the infinity norm.
From Lemma 3, the constraint (C4) can be exchanged with
dTTTRTRd ≤ ′. Finally, (C5) is a linear equality constraint.
The problem (14) then reduces to
maximize
d
TZ(i, :)d
subject to ||Qd||∞ ≤ 1 dTTTRTRd ≤ ′ Fd = 0.
This is a problem of maximizing a concave function under a
convex symmetric inequality constraints, and linear equality
constraints, so it is convex. 
Note that if there exists d such that Tzd 6= 0 and
[QT TTR F
T ]T d = 0, and if ′ ≥ 0, the problem (14) is
unbounded for at least one i. The attacker can then make
the deterministic part of a critical state arbitrary large, so the
influence of the stochastic components becomes negligible. In
that case, the optimal value of Problem 1 (resp. Problem 2)
goes to 1 (resp. +∞). This special case can be checked
separately, so we exclude it from the further analysis.
Assumption 3: null ([QT TTR F
T ]T ) ⊆ null( TZ).
Finally, we introduce the lemma that establishes a link
between maximizing E{z(i)1:N} and P(|z(i)1:N | > 1), which is
used in the proof of Theorem 1. We also revisit Jensen’s
inequality, which is used in the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 4: Let µi(d) = E{z(i)1:N}, Pi(d) = P(|z(i)1:N | > 1),
and Cd be a symmetric set. If d∗1 = argmaxd∈Cd µi(d) and
d∗2 = argmaxd∈Cd Pi(d), then Pi(d
∗
1) = Pi(d
∗
2).
Lemma 5: (Jensen’s inequality [38]) Let φ be a convex
function defined on a convex subset Cφ of Rn, and let X
be an n-dimensional integrable random vector that satisfies
P(X ∈ Cφ) = 1. Then φ(E{X}) ≤ E{φ(X)}.
B. Solving Problem 1
We now introduce Algorithm 1, and prove that it solves
Problem 1. This algorithm solves (14) for each i from
{1, . . . , nzN}. Once the solution d∗i is obtained, the algorithm
calculates Pi(d∗i ) = P(|z(i)1:N | > 1). This is possible since
z1:N ∼ N (TZd∗i ,ΣZ) (Lemma 2), so z(i)1:N (N) is Gaussian
random variable with distribution N (TZ(i, :)d∗i ,ΣZ(i, i)). The
largest Pi(d∗i ) is then returned as the attack impact.
Theorem 1: Let I∗1 be the optimal value of Problem 1 and
let I ′1 be the value returned by Algorithm 1. Then I
∗
1 = I
′
1.
Proof. The constraints of Problem 1 are independent of i.
Thus, Problem 1 can be solved in the following two steps. In
the first step, we solve P ∗i = maximized∈C P(|z(i)0:N | > 1) for
each i ∈ {1, . . . , nzN}. In the second step, we find the optimal
value of the attack impact as I∗1 = maxi∈{1,...,nzN} P
∗
i .
We now show that Algorithm 1 performs these two steps.
Firstly, Algorithm 1 finds d∗i that maximizes µi(d) over C
for each i. Recall that C is convex and symmetric constraint
in d (Proposition 1). Therefore, based on Lemma 4, d∗i is
also maximizer of P(|z(i)0:N | > 1) over C. Thus, the algorithm
finds P ∗i for each i, which is the first step of the procedure.
The algorithm then performs the second step of the procedure
(Line 7). Thus, Algorithm 1 returns the optimal value of
Problem 1, which concludes the proof. 
Theorem 1 represents an interesting extension of the work
on deterministic systems [19], which used the infinity norm
Algorithm 1 Calculating attack impact
1: Input: Model (7), Qyr , Qz , Fa, Tsx, Tsr, Tsf , N , 
2: Output: I ′1
3: for i = 1 : 1 : nzN do
4: Solve (14) for z(i)1:N to obtain d
∗
i
5: Calculate Pi(d∗i ) = P(|z(i)1:N | > 1)
6: end for
7: I ′1 = maxi∈{1,...,Nnz} Pi(d
∗
i )
based metric (8). In particular, Theorem 1 shows that for the
class of attacks we consider, the optimal value for the metric
I1 can be obtained by solving a set of convex optimization
problems. This is the same property that I had in the deter-
ministic systems case.
Remark 4: In Algorithm 1, the problem (14) needs to be
solved nzN times. However, a crucial observation is that
these problems are independent, so we can solve them in
parallel. Moreover, since we are performing off-line analysis,
the execution time is not of critical importance. 
Remark 5: Calculating Pi(d∗i ) needs to be done numerically.
However, due to importance of scalar Gaussian distribution,
this probability can be calculated with sufficiently large accu-
racy and in the computational time that is negligible compared
to the computational time of solving (14). 
C. Lower Bound for Problem 2
We now show that in the process of solving Problem 1,
we also obtain a lower bound for Problem 2. Note that
Algorithm 1 finds the optimal value µi(d∗i ) of (14) for each i
from {1, . . . , Nnz}. Let I ′2 be defined as
I ′2 = maxi∈{1,...,Nnz} µi(d
∗
i ). (15)
In what follows, we prove that I ′2 can be used as the afore-
mentioned lower bound.
Theorem 2: Let I∗2 be the optimal value of Problem 2. Then
I ′2 ≤ I∗2 , where I ′2 is given by (15).
Proof. Let I ′′2 = maximized∈C ||E{z1:N}||∞. We first show
I ′′2 = I
′
2. Since, E{z1:N} = TZd, then
I ′2 = maxi∈{1,...,Nnz}maximized∈C TZ(i, :)d (16)
I ′′2 = maximized∈C ||TZd||∞. (17)
In our previous work [32], we used the fact that the problem of
maximizing ||TZd||∞ under the convex symmetric inequality
constraints can be solved by maximizing TZ(i, :)d over that
same constraints, and then finding maximum over i. The same
proof can be used for general symmetric convex constraints.
We include the proof here for reader’s convenience and for
the sake of completeness.
Let d′′2 be an optimal solution for which I
′′
2 is obtained, and
let rewrite I ′′2 as I
′′
2 = ||TZd′′2 ||∞ = |TZ(i′′, :)d′′2 |, where i′′ is
the number of row of the matrix TZ for which the maximum
of ||TZd′′2 ||∞ is achieved. Thus |TZ(i′′, :)d′′2 | ≥ TZ(i, :)d for
every i from {1, . . . , Nnz}, and every d from C. Since the con-
straint on d is C in both (16) and (17), then I ′2 ≤ I ′′2 . We now
show that I ′2 < I
′′
2 is not possible by using the contradiction
argument. Since C is symmetric constraint, we have that both
6d′′2 and −d′′2 are feasible points for (16) and (17). Moreover,
either TZ(i′′, :)d′′2 or TZ(i
′′, :)(−d′′2) must be greater than 0.
Then it follows max{−TZ(i′′, :)d′′2 , TZ(i′′, :)d′′2} = I ′′2 > I ′2.
This contradicts the assumption that I ′2 is the optimal value
of (16), and we conclude I ′2 = I
′′
2 .
We now use Jensen’s inequality to finalize the proof. Let
Xz ∼ N (TZd′′2 ,ΣZ), and note that this random vector is with
finite mean (integrable) once Assumption 3 holds. Since every
norm is convex, it follows from Jensen’s inequality
I ′2 = I
′′
2 = ||E{Xz}||∞ ≤ E{||Xz||∞} = I2(d′′2).
Note that d′′2 is a feasible point for Problem 2. Thus, we have
I ′2 ≤ I2(d′′2) ≤ I∗2 , since I∗2 is the optimal value of Problem 2.
The proof is now completed. 
V. ATTACK STRATEGIES COMPATIBLE WITH PROBLEM 1
We now introduce attack strategies for which the impact
estimation problem can be reduced to Problem 1. To show
compatibility, we need to verify if a strategy can be modeled
by (6), and if a and as satisfy (12)–(13).
A. DoS, Rerouting, and Sign Alternation Attacks
We first consider strategies that can be modeled by
y˜(k) = Λyy(k) u˜(k) = Λuu(k). (18)
Note that (18) can be reduced to (6) by enforcing ay , au and
as to be zero. This constraint on ay and au can be reduced to
the constraint (12), by adopting Fa to be the identity matrix.
Further, if we set Tsx, Tsf , and Tsr to zero, the stochastic part
as satisfies the constraint (13). Therefore, the attack strategies
that satisfy (18) are according to equations (6), (12)–(13), so
their impact can be obtained by solving Problem 1. We now
introduce three strategies that can be modeled by (18).
The first strategy are DoS attacks. In this strategy, the
attacker blocks the signals of the sensors Y¯ = {j1, . . . , jnay }
and actuators U¯ = {i1, . . . , inau} from reaching their destina-
tion. For example, the attacker can physically damage these
devices, or jam the network [6]. The DoS attacks can be
modeled by (18) (see [6], [23]), where the matrices Λy and
Λu are diagonal matrices defined by
Λy(i, i) =
{
1, i /∈ Y¯
0, i ∈ Y¯ Λu(i, i) =
{
1, i /∈ U¯
0, i ∈ U¯ . (19)
The second strategy are rerouting attacks. This strategy
consists of the attacker permuting the values of the measure-
ment and control signals under its control [25], [26]. The
attacker can perform this attack by physically re-wiring the
sensor cables, or by modifying the sender’s address [26]. The
measurements and control inputs during the rerouting attack
are given by (18), where Λy and Λu are permutation matrices
that satisfy Λy(i, i) = 1 for i /∈ Y¯ and Λu(i, i) = 1 for i /∈ U¯ .
The third attack strategy are the sign alternation attacks,
where the attacker flips the sign of the measurement and
control signals under its control. Although simple, this at-
tack can turn negative feedback into positive, and potentially
destabilize the system. Moreover, it was shown that in certain
configurations, this attack strategy leads to strictly stealthy
attacks [12]. The attack is according to (18), where Λu and
Λy are diagonal matrices given by
Λy(i, i) =
{
−1, i ∈ Y¯
1, i /∈ Y¯ Λu(i, i) =
{
−1, i ∈ U¯
1, i /∈ U¯ .
B. FDI and Bias Injection Attacks
In FDI attacks, the attacker is able to manipulate sensors Y¯
and actuators U¯ , and knows the whole model of the plant [8],
[19]. Based on these resources, the attacker constructs an
optimal attack sequence a0:N that maximizes some impact
metric. Signals y˜ and u˜ are given by
y˜(k) = y(k) + Γyay(k) u˜(k) = u(k) + Γuau(k). (20)
The matrices Γy and Γu are defined based on Y¯ and U¯ . If
Y¯ = {j1, . . . , jnay }, then the elements (j1, 1), . . . , (jnay , nay )
of the matrix Γy are equal to one, and the remaining elements
are equal to zero. The matrix Γu is defined in a similar manner
based on U¯ . Note that (20) can be reduced to (6) by adopting
Λy = Iny and Λu = Inu , and enforcing as = 0. We do not
have any restrictions on au and ay , so we select Fa to be the
zero matrix in the constraint (12). The stochastic part of the
attack is as = 0, which satisfies the constraint of the form (13).
Therefore, this strategy satisfies the attack model we proposed,
and its impact can be estimated by solving Problem 1.
Remark 6: If N → +∞ and  = 0, it can be shown that
Problem 1 reduces to
maximize
yr,a0,...
I1(yr, a0, . . .)
subject to xe(k + 1) = A˜xe(k) + G˜a(k) xe(0) = T0yr
0 = C˜xe(k) + H˜a(k) ||Qyryr||∞ ≤ 1.
What is interesting to note is that the constraints enforce
zero dynamics attacks, with the initial condition restricted
to T0yr [22], [39]. If we additionally impose yr = 0, then
perfectly undetectable attacks are enforced [40], [41]. 
We now introduce the bias injection attacks. This strategy
is a less sophisticated type of injection attacks, since the
attacker adds a constant bias to the measurement and control
signals under its control [17], [22]. Signals y˜ and u˜ in this
attack strategy are modeled same as in (20). In addition to the
constraints for FDI attacks, the deterministic parts of the attack
need to satisfy ay(k) = ay(0), au(k) = au(0) for N ≥ k > 0.
These constraints on au and ay are reducible to (12). Thus,
this strategy is also compatible with our framework.
One can also imagine the combination of FDI and DoS
attacks [42], [43], where the attacker can inject corrupted data
to the measurements Y¯I and controls U¯I , but can only deny
access to Y¯D and U¯D. The attack can then be modeled as
y˜(k) = Λyy(k) + Γyay(k) u˜(k) = Λuu(k) + Γuau(k)
where Λy and Λu are defined based on Y¯D and U¯D as in (19),
and Γy and Γu are defined based on Y¯I and U¯I as in (20).
This equation is of the same form as (6), with as = 0. The
signals ay and au are free for the attacker to choose, which is
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according to (12). Since as = 0, (13) is also satisfied. Thus, we
conclude that this strategy is compatible with our framework.
C. Replay Attacks
Replay attacks are inspired by the well known Stuxnet
malware [4]. The attacker first records steady state sensor mea-
surements. It then starts sending these healthy measurements
from the sensors Y¯ under its control, while at the same time
manipulates the compromised actuators U¯ in a malicious way.
The replay attack on sensors can be modeled by
y˜(k) = Λyy(k) + Γyas(k) (21)
where Λy is given as in (19). The signal as is given by
as(k) = CY¯y(k −N − 1) (22)
where CY¯ ∈ Rnay×ny is defined based on the set of at-
tacked sensors Y¯ . If Y¯ = {j1, . . . , jnay }, then the elements
(1, j1), . . . , (nay , jnay ) of CY¯ are one, and the remaining
elements are zero. In other words, the attacker replaces the
attacked measurements with the measurements of the normal
operation previously recorded at times k ∈ [−N − 1,−1].
The signal au sent to the actuators could be modeled in
different ways. For example, in our previous work [32], we
assumed that au is a constant bias, that is
u˜(k) = u(k) + Γuau(0) (23)
where Γu is defined as in (20). This models the case where the
attacker sends some large signal to actuators. Another scenario
can be a DoS attack against the actuators
u˜(k) = Λuu(k) (24)
where Λu is given as in (18). Both of the previously introduced
scenarios of replay attacks can be captured with the general
attack model. The proof is available in Appendix B.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We now illustrate how the modeling framework we pro-
posed can be used for risk assessment, and explore how the
tuning parameters influence the impact of different strategies.
A. System Model
We consider a chemical process from [44] shown in Fig-
ure 1 a). The states are the volume in Tank 3 (x1), the volume
in Tank 2 (x2), and the temperature in Tank 2 (x3). The control
signals are the flow rate of Pump 2 (u1), the openness of the
valve (u2), the flow rate of Pump 1 (u3), and the power of the
heater (u4). We assume that the control objective is to keep a
constant temperature in Tank 2. The objective is achieved by
injecting hot water from Tank 1, and cold water from Tank 3.
The plant is described by
A =
 0.96 0 00.04 0.97 0
−0.04 0 0.90
B =
 8.8 −2.3 0 00.20 2.2 4.9 0
−0.21 −2.2 1.9 21

Pump 1 
Tank 1 Tank 2 
Hot 
Water 
Tank 3 
↑ Pump 2 
Valve 
S S 
Level 
Tank 2 
Temp. 
S 
Level 
Tank 3  
Cold 
Water 
Heater. 
Product 
↑
 
a) 
Controller 
Anomaly Detector 
Router 1 Router 2 
Pump 1      Level   Temperature      Heater          Pump 2             Level               Valve 
                 Tank 2                                                                         Tank 3  
↑ S ↑ S S 
Link 1 Link 2 
b) 
Fig. 1. a) Physical part of chemical process with four actuators (two pumps,
heater, and valve), and three sensors (two level sensors and one temperature
sensor); b) Cyber infrastructure of the process.
C = I3, Σv = 0.05 I3, and Σw = 0.01 I3. The matrices of the
controller are given by
Lxˆ = 0.01
 10 1.8 −0.1−2.0 7.1 −0.51.4 16 0.2
−0.4 −0.7 4.2
Lyr = 0.01
11 11 0−1 44 00 0 0
0 4.7 4.7
 .
We assumed Qyr = 0.4 I3, and we used the steady state
Kalman filter as an estimator.
A cyber-infrastructure is assumed to be as shown in Fig-
ure 1 b). It was identified that the communication link between
Router 1 and the controller is not protected (Vulnerability 1).
The same holds for the communication link between Router 2
and the controller (Vulnerability 2). If the attacker exploits
Vulnerability 1, it gains control over sensors y2, y3 and ac-
tuators u3, u4. In the case of Vulnerability 2, sensor y1 and
actuators u1, u2 can be manipulated.
B. Risk Assessment
Our goal is to investigate which of these two vulnerabilities
is more threatening to our system. For this, we use our
framework. We set Qz = [01×2 1/3 01×3], N = 10,  = 0.3,
and we use the metric I1. We then calculated the impacts of
DoS [6], [23], rerouting [25], [26], replay [24], FDI [8], [19]
and bias injection [17], [22] attacks once Vulnerability 1 and
Vulnerability 2 are exploited. Since the attacker can conduct
DoS and rerouting attacks in multiple ways, we calculated the
worst case impact for these strategies. For the replay strategy,
the attack against the actuators was modeled according to (24).
The results of the analysis are illustrated in Figure 2. Firstly,
note that the impact of different strategies may result in differ-
ent conclusions concerning the importance of vulnerabilities.
For instance, based on the impact of DoS attacks, it follows
that Vulnerability 2 is more important to be prevented than
Vulnerability 1. On the other hand, based on the impact of
replay, FDI, and bias attacks, Vulnerability 1 is more critical.
The impact of rerouting attacks was not informative, since
it was equal to 0 in both of the cases. This illustrates the
point that in some cases, attack impact of several strategies
needs to be taken into consideration to decide on importance
8DoS
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
I1
Vulnerability 1
Vulnerability 2
FDI Replay Rerouting Bias
Fig. 2. Impact of different attacks once Vulnerability 1 and Vulnerability 2
are exploited.
10 20 30 40 50
 N
0
0.5
1
I1
DoS FDI Replay Rerouting Bias
2
Fig. 3. Impact of different attack strategies in respect to N .
of vulnerabilities. In this case, we can give higher priority
to Vulnerability 1, since the impact of majority of attack
strategies is larger for this vulnerability.
It is also interesting to note that sometimes less complex
attacks can be just as dangerous as full model knowledge FDI
attacks. For example, in the case of Vulnerability 1, replay
attacks lead to the same impact as FDI attacks. Finally, we
note that the stochastic model of the system can considerably
influence the impact of some attacks. In particular, rerouting
attacks proved to be harmless in this framework, because they
were detectable in both of the scenarios. However, in our
previous study on deterministic systems [32], these attacks
had impact comparable with DoS and bias injection attacks.
C. Tuning Parameters
In our framework, the impact estimation problem has  and
N as tunning parameters. By increasing , the stealthiness
constraint becomes easier to satisfy. Thus, it is clear that
the impact is nondecreasing with respect to . However, the
connection of the impact to the length of horizon N is not
obvious. To illustrate some interesting facts, we investigate
how the impact changes when we vary N in the range 2 to
50. We fixed other modeling parameters to be the same as
in the previous two sections, assumed Vulnerability 2 to be
exploited, and considered the same attack strategies.
A plot of the impact of different strategies in respect to
N is shown on Figure 3. The first interesting observation is
that the impact of almost all the strategies seems to converge
to a steady state relatively quickly. In fact, only the impact
of the replay strategy keeps increasing over time. The second
observation is that attack impact can also be decreasing with
N , as in the case of bias injection attacks. We find the reason
to be that the stealthiness constraint becomes harder to satisfy,
while the number of decision variables in the problem remains
the same. Both of these observations point out that in certain
cases, we do not have to consider long horizon lengths in order
to find the worst case attack impact.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We proposed a framework for estimating impact of a
range of cyber-attack strategies, which is independent of the
choice of anomaly detector. Furthermore, we suggested two
alternatives for the impact metric based on the infinity norm
that can be used in stochastic systems. For the first metric, we
proved that the problem of estimating attack impact can be
reduced to the problem of solving a set of convex problems,
so the exact solution can be obtained efficiently (Theorem 1).
For the second metric, an easily computable lower bound
was proposed (Theorem 2). Finally, we demonstrated how our
modeling framework can be used for risk assessment on an
illustrative example. There are two main directions that we
plan to explore in the future work. Firstly, we plan to further
study monotonicity of the attack impact with respect to N .
Secondly, we will investigate if the impact of feedback attacks
can be analyzed using the proposed framework.
APPENDIX
A. Proofs of the Lemmas from Section IV.A
Proof of Lemma 1. In absence of attacks, the extended state
xe is given by
xe(k + 1) = Aexe(k) +Bef(k) + Eeyr (25)
where Ae,Be and Ee are respectively obtained from A˜, B˜, and
E˜ by setting Λy = Iny and Λu = Inu , and f is zero mean
Gaussian white process whose covariance we denote by Σf .
Assume yr = 0. Since Ae is assumed to be asymptotically
stable, it is known that xe is zero mean Gaussian stationary
process with the covariance matrix obtained as the solution of
the Lyapunov equation Σ0 = AeΣ0ATe + BeΣfB
T
e (see [33,
Chapter 4]). Once yr 6= 0, only the mean value of the process
changes. Since we assumed that the system has reached the
steady state, we have E{xe} = AeE{xe} + Eeyr, which
implies E{xe} = T0yr, where T0 = (I2nx −Ae)−1Ee. 
Proof of Lemma 2. We first consider z1:N . Since the system
before and after the attack is linear, z1:N can be expressed as
z1:N = Pxxe(Ns) + PffNs:N + Pryr + Paa0:N + Psas0:N .
(26)
From (13), it follows
z1:N = P
′
xxe(Ns) + P
′
ffNs:N + P
′
ryr + Paa0:N (27)
where P ′f = Pf + Ps[Tsf 0(N+1)nay×(N+1)nf ], P
′
x = Px +
PsTsx, and P ′r = Pr + PsTsr. Since xe(Ns) and fNs:N are
independent Gaussian vectors, and a0:N and yr are determin-
istic, z1:N is a Gaussian vector. Using the linearity property
of expected value operator and Lemma 1, we get
E{z1:N} = P ′xT0yr + P ′f0 + P ′ryr + Paa0:N = TZd (28)
SHELL et al.: BARE DEMO OF IEEETRAN.CLS FOR IEEE JOURNALS 9
where TZ =
[
Pa P
′
xT0 + P
′
r
]
. Let the covariance matrix of
fNs:N be denoted with ΣF . We then have
ΣZ = P
′
xΣ0(P
′
x)
T + P ′fΣF (P
′
f )
T (29)
where we used that xe(Ns) and fNs:N are independent. Since
Σ0 and ΣF are dependent only on the noise properties and
the system matrices, ΣZ is fixed and not dependent on d. The
proof that r˜0:N ∼ N (TRd,ΣR) follows the same steps (26)–
(29), so we omit it due to page limit.
It remains to prove that ΣZ is positive definite. Equa-
tion (27) can be rewritten as
z1:N = P
′
xxe(Ns) + PfpfNs:−1 + Pvv0:N−1 + Pww0:N−1
+ P ′ryr + Paa0:N + 0v(N) + 0w(N).
Since P ′xxe(Ns), PfpfNs:−1, Pvv0:N−1, Pww0:N−1 are in-
dependent Gaussian vectors, ΣZ is the sum of covariance
matrices of these vectors. Thus, it suffices to prove that one of
these vectors has a positive definite covariance matrix. It can
be shown from (1) and z(k) = Qzx(k) that Pv is the lower
triangular matrix of the form
Pv =

Qz 0nz×nx . . . 0nz×nx
× Qz . . . 0nz×nx
...
...
. . .
...
× × . . . Qz
 .
It then follows that null(PTv ) = ∅, since Qz has full row
rank. Let ΣV be the covariance matrix of v0:N−1. Since Σv
is positive definite, so it is ΣV . Thus, PvΣV (Pv)T is positive
definite, which implies that ΣZ is positive definite. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Let Y1 and Y2 be random vectors with
the distributions N (µ1,Σ1) and N (µ2,Σ2), respectively. Let
Σ1 and Σ2 be positive definite. Then
D(Y1||Y2) = 0.5(tr(Σ−12 Σ1)+||µ2−µ1||Σ−12 +ln
det(Σ2)
det(Σ1)
−n)
where n is the dimension of Y1 and Y2 [45]. In our case,
the distributions of r˜0:N and r0:N are N (TRd,ΣR) and
N (0(N+1)ny×1, I(N+1)ny ), respectively. Thus, it follows
D(r˜0:N ||r0:N ) = 0.5
(
tr(ΣR) + (TRd)TTRd− (N + 1)ny−
ln det(ΣR)
)
= cKL +
1
2
dTTTRTRd
where cKL = 0.5(tr(ΣR)− (N + 1)ny − ln det(ΣR)). There-
fore, (11) becomes dTTTRTRd ≤ ′, where ′ = 2((N + 1)−
cKL) = (N + 1)(2+ ny)− tr(ΣR) + ln det(ΣR). 
Proof of Lemma 4. From Lemma 2, z1:N is a Gaussian ran-
dom vector with the non-degenerate distribution N (TZd,ΣZ).
Thus, z(i)1:N is a Gaussian random variable with the distribution
N (µi(d), σ2i ), where µi(d) = TZ(i, :)d, and σ2i = ΣZ(i, i).
We first consider probability P ′i (d) = P(|z(i)1:N | ≤ 1). Let
c1 = 1/(
√
2piσi) and c2 = −1/(2σ2i ). We then have
P ′i (d) =
∫ 1
−1
c1e
c2(x−µi(d))2dx =
∫ 1−µi(d)
−1−µi(d)
c1e
c2t
2
dt. (30)
Note that d influences P ′i (d) only through µi(d). In what
follows, we outline two important properties of P ′i (d) in
respect to µi(d).
Firstly, note that e−c2t
2
is symmetric in t, and the bounds
of the integral (30) are −1− µi(d) and 1− µi(d). Therefore,
P ′i (d) is symmetric in µi(d). Secondly, we show that P
′
i (d)
is decreasing when |µi(d)| is increasing. Let µi(d1) = µi and
µi(d2) = µi + δ, where µi ≥ 0 and δ > 0. Then
P ′i (d1) =
∫ 1−µi−δ
−1−µi
c1e
c2t
2
dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=I
+
∫ 1−µi
1−µi−δ
c1e
c2t
2
dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=∆1
P ′i (d2) =
∫ −1−µi
−1−µi−δ
c1e
c2t
2
dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=∆2
+
∫ 1−µi−δ
−1−µi
c1e
c2t
2
dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=I
.
Note that the intervals
[1− µi − δ, 1− µi] [−1− µi − δ,−1− µi]
are of the same length δ. Additionally
|1− µi| ≤ | − 1− µi|
and e−c2t
2
is decreasing in |t|. Hence, we conclude ∆2 < ∆1.
Therefore, P ′i (d) is decreasing when µi(d) ≥ 0 is increasing.
Additionally, because of symmetry of P ′i (d), we have that
P ′i (d) is decreasing when |µi(d)| is increasing.
From the previous discussion, we conclude that Pi(d) is
increasing when |µi(d)| is increasing, since Pi(d) = 1−P ′i (d).
Furthermore, if we have a symmetric set Cd, and if we find
d∗ that maximizes µi(d), then we know that d∗ maximizes
|µi(d)| over Cd as well. Finally, this d∗ maximizes Pi(d) on
Cd, since Pi(d) is increasing with |µi(d)|. 
B. Replay Attacks
Firstly, the equations (21)–(24) are all according to (6). The
deterministic part ay satisfies (12), since ay = 0. The same
holds for au if (24) is used to model actuator attacks. If (23)
is used, au needs to satisfy au(k) = au(0) for 0 ≤ k ≤ N ,
which is also reducible to (12).
It remains to be shown that the stochastic part of the attack
as satisfies (13). Let Ns = −N − 1, and let k be the time
instant that satisfies Ns ≤ k < 0. From (25), xe(k) in the
absence of attacks is dependent only on x(Ns), f , and yr, so
CY¯y(k) can be expressed as
CY¯y(k) = T
(k)
sx x(Ns) + T
(k)
sr yr + T
(k)
sf fNs:−1.
Finally, from (22), as0:N equals
as0:N =
CY¯y(Ns)...
CY¯y(−1)
 = Tsxx(Ns) + Tsryr + TsffNs:−1
where
Tsx =

T
(Ns)
sx
...
T
(−1)
sx
 Tsr =

T
(Ns)
sr
...
T
(−1)
sr
 Tsf =

T
(Ns)
sf
...
T
(−1)
sf
 .
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